Alfred Ayer: 'Language, Truth and Logic'

Chapter One:

The process of elimination and eradication of all philosopher's prior babble and grapples with things so overcomplicated its unnecessary 'a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discover' (pg 13). Sense experience is surely an empirical situation? How do we differentiate between raw reality and past experience, how do we limit thought? Metaphysics always questions what there is, and what it is like. Ayer doesn't reprimand the metaphysician for attempting something completely fruitless but perhaps not specific. Ayer uses the example of a sentence, even if it grammatically asks a questions but we already know the answer we might not see it as a question at all. Also, in terms of thinking 'what things are like', there is the practical issue of being able to place oneself where an observation can be made. One has to settle with the idea that some things are achievable only theoretically and not practically, as Ayer uses the example of seeing the other side of the moon.

Ayer questions whether a sentence can be deemed factual if it is truthful and if the information it contains can be proved, and further to that, proved by experience. Hence his terms factual proposition versus experimental propositions. Perhaps the sense cannot be considered providers of 'rea' information since Ayer reminds us that the sense can sometimes deceive us. Ideas about appearance versus reality.

On page 25 Ayer discusses the phrase 'martyrs suffer' and the phrase 'martyrs exist'. Because they are both grammatically organised in the same way, our logic categorises them the same, but actually the phrases are very logically different. Yes, there can be real proof that martyrs suffer, but martyrs do not exist since the whole point in being a labeled a martyr is the nation of dying for something strongly believed in. Therefore the phrase should be 'martyrs did exist' or 'martyrs existed'. If it is easy to write nonsensical sentences without meaning to be nonsensical, or indeed seeing that they are even nonsensical, then it is also (proof) possible that common problems of philosophy or nonsensical and that if philosophy is to be considered an eligible branch of philosophy it must be differentiated from metaphysics.

Chapter Two: The Functions of Philosophy

Ayer seems against deductive logic for the sake of it or as considered a main philosophical trend, he also appears against generalisation and 'laws of nature'. He doesn't see why starting points and conclusions have to correlate and be of such exactitude for successful winning of arguments. 'Thus we may conclude that it is not possible to deduce all our knowledge from 'first principles' (page 31). Yet there is this belief that it is the philosopher's duty to find the first principle.